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CWE-Classified Cryptocurrency & Privacy Incident Ledger

Empirical forensic reconstructions, storage-slot calldata breakdowns, and open CC-BY 4.0 datasets covering multisig UI spoofing, EIP-7702 sweepers, supply-chain drainers, and custody failures.

OFFLINE SANDBOX (connect-src 'none') Zero network uploads | Client-side deterministic execution

Interactive CWE & Exploit-Class Forensic Ledger Filter

Showing all 16 audited incidents Download JSON (CC-BY 4.0) Download CSV
ID / Date Target & Chain Loss (USD) CWE & Attribution Forensic Vector Summary
DT-INC-2025-001
2025-02-21
Bybit Cold Multisig (Safe{Wallet} UI Compromise)
Ethereum
$1460.0M CWE-494
Lazarus Group (DPRK TraderTraitor)
Compromised Safe{Wallet} developer workstation injected malicious JS into AWS S3 bundle, tricking 3 Ledger signers into blind-signing operation=1 DELEGATECALL overwriting slot 0 singleton.
DT-INC-2025-002
2025-05-18
Ethereum Pectra EIP-7702 Sweeper Delegation Wave
Ethereum / Base / Arbitrum / BSC
$14.8M CWE-345
Inferno & Pink Drainer Affiliates
Phishing dApps & leaked keys signed 0x04 SET_CODE tuples (often chain_id=0 cross-chain) delegating EOAs to automated sweeper contracts draining incoming deposits instantly.
DT-INC-2025-003
2025-03-21
Tornado Cash Immutable Pool Sanctions & Van Loon Reversal
Ethereum
Statutory / PII CWE-284
OFAC SDN / U.S. Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit ruled immutable smart contracts without admin keys are not 'property' under IEEPA, leading to March 2025 OFAC delisting while developer criminal litigation continued.
DT-INC-2024-008
2024-10-16
Radiant Capital Multisig Compromise
Arbitrum / BSC
$53.0M CWE-345
UNC4736 (DPRK)
Trojanized Telegram ZIP infected 3-of-11 developers on macOS, intercepting Safe web requests to display benign calldata while hardware wallets blind-signed transferOwnership.
DT-INC-2024-006
2024-07-18
WazirX Liminal Multisig Exploit
Ethereum
$234.9M CWE-345
Lazarus Group (DPRK)
UI payload mismatch between frontend coordinator display and raw Safe multisig hash tricked 4 signers into upgrading proxy implementation to attacker drainer.
DT-INC-2024-004
2024-05-31
DMM Bitcoin Private Key Compromise
Bitcoin
$305.0M CWE-522
TraderTraitor (DPRK)
Fake LinkedIn coding test compromised Ginco wallet infrastructure engineer, allowing unauthorized co-signing of 4,502.9 BTC.
DT-INC-2024-003
2024-05-03
WBTC Vanity Address Poisoning Heist
Ethereum
$68.0M CWE-451
On-Chain Vanity Poisoning Syndicate
Zero-value dust transfer from vanity address matching victim prefix/suffix tricked victim into copying poisoned destination from truncated transaction history.
DT-INC-2023-009
2023-12-14
Ledger Connect Kit NPM / CDN Supply Chain Attack
EVM Multi-Chain
$0.6M CWE-829
Angel Drainer Affiliate
Unrevoked NPM publish token of former employee allowed push of @ledgerhq/connect-kit v1.1.5-1.1.7, served immediately via unpinned jsDelivr CDN to hundreds of dApps.
DT-INC-2023-007
2023-07-06
Multichain MPC Custody Single-Point Collapse
Fantom / Ethereum
$126.0M CWE-269
Insider / Single-Custodian Cloud Key Concentration
Alleged distributed SMPC shards were all controlled under a single cloud account held by CEO, proving unverified MPC claims equal custodial risk.
DT-INC-2023-005
2023-06-03
Atomic Wallet Closed-Source Telemetry / Key Drain
Multi-Chain
$100.0M CWE-312
Lazarus Group (DPRK)
Mass asynchronous drain across thousands of retail non-custodial desktop/mobile installs lacking reproducible builds or hardware isolation.
DT-INC-2023-002
2023-03-13
Euler Finance donateToReserves Flash-Loan Exploit
Ethereum
$197.0M CWE-682
Independent Exploiter (Funds Returned)
Missing liquidity solvency check inside donateToReserves allowed leveraged flash-loan self-liquidation bad debt creation.
DT-INC-2022-009
2022-11-11
FTX Custodial Commingling & Unauthorized Hot-Wallet Drain
Multi-Chain
$8000.0M CWE-284
Alameda / FTX Executive Backdoor + SIM-Swap Drainer
Omnibus custodial commingling plus single-server AWS root keys resulted in $8B balance-sheet hole and $477M bankruptcy-night hot-wallet theft.
DT-INC-2022-006
2022-08-02
Slope Mobile Wallet Sentry Plaintext Seed Leak
Solana
$4.1M CWE-532
Telemetry Logging Misconfiguration
Mobile wallet crash-reporting SDK transmitted raw BIP-39 seed phrases in plaintext HTTPS POST payloads to centralized Sentry logging server, draining 9,231 wallets.
DT-INC-2022-003
2022-03-23
Ronin Bridge 5-of-9 Validator Key Compromise
Ethereum / Ronin
$624.0M CWE-287
Lazarus Group (DPRK)
Social-engineered PDF job offer compromised Sky Mavis validator nodes plus an unrevoked temporary Axie DAO allowlist signature.
DT-INC-2022-001
2022-02-02
Wormhole Solana SignatureSet Spoofing
Solana / Ethereum
$326.0M CWE-347
Smart Contract Exploiter
Deprecated load_instruction_at_unverified sysvar call allowed spoofed Guardian signature verification minting 120,000 unbacked wETH.
DT-INC-2020-004
2020-06-29
Ledger Shopify E-Commerce PII Database Breach
Off-Chain Physical OPSEC
Statutory / PII CWE-200
E-Commerce API Key Leak
272,853 physical home addresses, phone numbers, and full names of hardware wallet buyers leaked online, fueling multi-year SIM-swap and home-invasion wrench attacks.
Empirical Threat Shift (2020-2026)
Between 2020 and 2026, high-impact cryptocurrency losses shifted decisively from isolated Solidity arithmetic bugs toward off-chain signing orchestration and supply-chain compromise. Compromised Safe web bundles, unpinned NPM/CDN wallet connectors, EIP-7702 SET_CODE sweeper delegations, and social-engineered validator signers now account for the majority of multi-hundred-million-dollar drains despite intact hardware Secure Elements.

Structural Shift in Exploit Root Causes: From Contract Logic to Signing Orchestration

Existing incident trackers either lock forensic data behind JavaScript single-page shells that search engines and researchers cannot archive, or lump fundamentally unrelated failures under vague tags. A flash-loan solvency miscalculation inside an automated market maker (CWE-682) requires formal verification and invariant fuzzing; a compromised AWS S3 frontend JavaScript bundle that tricks three hardware-wallet custodians into blind-signing a Safe operation=1 DELEGATECALL overwriting storage slot 0x0 (CWE-494 + CWE-345) requires air-gapped out-of-band calldata decoding and ERC-7730 clear-signing hardware displays.

The DT.gl Incident Ledger pre-renders every forensic record as semantic HTML backed by structured YAML/MDX collections (`16` baseline events in V1 plus deep byte-level post-mortems), paired with direct one-click verification presets inside our offline EVM Calldata & Signature Auditor.

Audited Incident Impact by Root-Cause Vulnerability Class DOMINANT EXPLOIT VECTORS IN DT.GL V1 FORENSIC CORPUS (NON-CUSTODIAL & BRIDGE FOCUS) Multisig UI Spoofing & Blind Signing (CWE-345/494) $1.75B Bridge Validator & Signature Spoofing (CWE-287/347) $1.08B Non-Custodial / Infrastructure Key Theft (CWE-522) $405M Protocol Logic & Oracle Manipulation (CWE-682) $197M Vanity Poisoning, EIP-7702 & Supply Chain (CWE-451/829) $83M+
DIAGRAM 1.1 // Non-custodial exploit concentration showing dominance of coordinator UI spoofing and validator key compromise (excludes $8B FTX omnibus custodial insolvency outlier).

Deep-Dive Forensic Post-Mortem Monographs

Each flagship post-mortem below reconstructs exact UTC transaction timelines, mutated EVM storage slots or NPM package hashes, adversary tradecraft, and reproducible hardware/protocol mitigations:

Open Machine-Readable Dataset Schema (`CC-BY 4.0`)

Security teams, academic researchers, and data journalists can ingest the DT.gl Incident Ledger programmatically via /incidents/dataset.json or /incidents/dataset.csv, and subscribe to new forensic reconstructions via /incidents/rss.xml. Each record guarantees stable DT-INC-YYYY-NNN identifiers, ISO dates, USD exploit values, MITRE CWE codes, and canonical specification routes. For broader systemic context and historical custody failure analysis, consult our flagship synthesis at Major Cryptocurrency Incidents & Systemic Risk.

MITRE CWE Vulnerability Taxonomy for Cryptographic & Custody Incidents

Standardizing post-mortem root causes onto formal MITRE Common Weakness Enumerations allows treasury operators and protocol auditors to map historical exploits directly onto preventative engineering controls:

  • CWE-345 (Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity) & CWE-451 (User Interface Misrepresentation): Covers multisig UI spoofing (Bybit, WazirX, Radiant Capital), vanity address poisoning ($68M WBTC heist), and deceptive EIP-7702 SetCode phishing prompts. Mitigated only when hardware signers parse raw structured fields via ERC-7730 clear-signing descriptors and independent air-gapped verification workstations recompute safeTxHash digests out-of-band.
  • CWE-494 (Download of Code Without Integrity Check) & CWE-829 (Inclusion of Functionality from Untrusted Control Sphere): Covers compromised AWS S3 web bundles and unpinned NPM/jsDelivr wallet connectors (Ledger Connect Kit). Mitigated via immutable content-addressed deployments (IPFS/Arweave hashes or local desktop packages), Subresource Integrity (SRI) SHA-384 hashes, and hardware-key-gated NPM publishing with SLSA build provenance.
  • CWE-287 / CWE-347 (Improper Verification of Cryptographic Signature) & CWE-269 (Improper Privilege Management): Covers cross-chain bridge validator quorum takeovers (Ronin 5-of-9), unverified signature sysvar calls (Wormhole), and centralized cloud key custody disguised as distributed MPC (Multichain).
  • CWE-532 (Insertion of Sensitive Information into Log File) & CWE-200 (Exposure of Sensitive Information): Covers wallet crash-reporting SDKs logging plaintext BIP-39 mnemonics (Slope Sentry leak) and e-commerce buyer PII breaches (Ledger Shopify leak, Trezor Mailchimp breach) that expose self-custody holders to targeted SIM swaps and physical coercion.

Mandatory Pre-Signing Treasury Multisig Runbook

Institutional and DAO multisig signers operating Safe or threshold custody vaults should enforce a strict four-step ceremony prior to touching any hardware security module button:

  1. Out-of-Band Coordinator Diversity: Never allow all threshold signers to load the same hosted web UI simultaneously. At least one quorum signer must reconstruct the transaction calldata independently via CLI or our offline Calldata & Signature Auditor on an isolated OS profile.
  2. Zero-Tolerance `operation=1` (`DELEGATECALL`) Policy: Standard asset transfers, ERC-20 approvals, and staking interactions always use operation = 0 (CALL). Any Safe payload specifying operation = 1 grants the target contract unrestricted write access to storage slot 0x0 (the singleton implementation pointer) and must be halted unless verified against an audited canonical migration contract byte-for-byte.
  3. Domain Separator & `safeTxHash` Byte Comparison: Verify both the 32-byte EIP-712 domainSeparator and safeTxHash displayed on the physical hardware wallet screen against the locally computed Keccak-256 digest rather than trusting browser extension popups.
  4. Post-Pectra `EIP-7702` Code-Slot Monitoring: Monitor EOA signers for unexpected 0xef0100 delegation designators and reject any signature request bearing magic byte 0x05 or transaction type 0x04 with chain_id = 0.

Frequently Verified Technical Questions

Why does DT.gl classify cryptocurrency incidents by MITRE CWE rather than generic DeFi labels?

Labels like wallet hack or bridge exploit obscure the actual engineering failure. Mapping incidents to MITRE Common Weakness Enumerations such as CWE-494 (Download of Code Without Integrity Check) or CWE-345 (Insufficient Verification of Data Authenticity) links each exploit directly to verifiable hardware clear-signing, subresource integrity, and protocol controls.

Primary Reference: MITRE CWE Database

Can researchers and journalists reuse the DT.gl Incident Ledger dataset?

Yes. Both the machine-readable /incidents/dataset.json and /incidents/dataset.csv endpoints are published under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC-BY 4.0) license with zero paywalls or API rate gates.

Primary Reference: Creative Commons CC-BY 4.0

Why are zero-dollar protocol sanctions and e-commerce PII breaches included alongside billion-dollar thefts?

Self-custody threat modeling encompasses three distinct failure modes: direct cryptographic asset drainage, off-chain customer database leaks that trigger physical home-invasion and SIM-swap attacks, and statutory actions against immutable smart contracts that reshape developer and user compliance risk.